The DEIS did not model yields past 1999. So let’s assume that NISP was completed and operational in 2000. How much water could we expect over the next 8 years?
A total of about 54,000 acre-feet, or 6,750 acre-feet per year (far less than the 40,000 ac-ft “promised”…
This does not account for the exchange operations on the Poudre which may have further reduced yield, and does not account for the internal Poudre call which was probably more restrictive on Glade Diversions. This is still somewhat preliminary, and we need to check our diversion rates which we capped at 3000 cfs.
In reality we don’t think 3000 cfs could be achieved at all times, because NISP’s diversions share structures with others, so NISP diversions would be subordinate to the diversions of others. So let’s look at the yield if the District was limited to just its own diversion points (about 500 cfs capacity each):
That’s about 35,000 acre-feet, or just 4,375 acre-feet per year, average.
[update] This is a relatively technical post, so some explanation on the methodology is warranted.
Bascially we simply looked at the call records to determine when the District’s rights would have been in priority, and, hence, when they would be entitled to divert water into Glade and Galeton. Our analysis focused solely on the call records on the mainstem dowstream of the confluence with the Poudre. Internal calls on the Poudre were not included because they have only recently been reported in the overall call record.
At any rate the call on the Poudre (internal) would have been senior and more restrictive than the mainstem call, so our reliance on the mainstem call is conservative in the sense that in reality less diversions would have occured on the Poudre than what we modeled.
So our modeled diversions were simply the lesser of the maximum allowed diversions (pursuant to the District’s decreed water rights) and the available flow at (1) the Kersey gauge, and (2) the Poudre Guage at the mouth of the Poudre, when in priority.
So our analysis was a bit simplistic, but simplistic in the sense that it did not include other limiting factors such as the the exchange potential from Galeton to Glade which is limited by both New Cache and Larimer and Weld diversions and actual flows on the Poudre in the exchange reach, and the Districts diversion capacities into Galeton and Glade.
Our estimates should probably be considered the maximum possible diversions and yield of NISP over the last 8 years.
The thing to keep in mind about NISP is that there are numerous senior rights – not direct flow, but junior recharge and refill rights – that are senior to NISP on the mainstem. As adminsistration on the mainstem gets tighter, the junior rights will begin enforcing their priorities; priorities which are senior to the NISP rights.
Hi Everyone, Happy 4th
From the graphing it’s easy to see that the years 2002 through 2006 were omitted and cover a significant dry spell. I’m not sure that five years constitute a drought. Historically drought periods of twelve years are within the norm. Twenty year droughts are not even that unusual. In the scheme of things five years is a blip in time. There were similar low precipitation years in the early fifties.
I can’t say exactly what years the DEIS did use in there computer modeling. Everyone is pretty well aware that the early thirties are considered drought years. What appears to be here is an example of what I call skewing. The computer and program may have done a fairly adequate job of crunching the numbers. However, simply by confining the years used the final results may not be representative.
Drought proofing with agriculture water is a concept I can’t comprehend. Ag water is usually consumed in the water year in which it was realized. This is do to practicality and often both state and federal law. If there was enough storage to get ag through a drought, there would be no water in the river and it would be behind the dam. So after just a few years when we’re far enough into a dry spell to realize that it could be a drought, the ag water is gone. At this point existing storage becomes sufficient as we have to live within what’s available.
What burns me up is that the way the water court has screwed things up is, Glade will be able to divert water on a priority that is junior to my irrigation wells while my wells stay shut off.
In other words, thanks the water court, Glade’s conditional 1984 or whatever it is priority trumps my wells’ 1939, 1954, and 1965 absolute priorities.
If we could take water out of the river on the day of our priority, either for direct use or augmentation, there would not be much water left for Glade to take.
No desert society has ever been drought proof that depended solely on surface flows. The new world on both continents has numerous examples of cultures that tried. To drought proof as Greg speaks of it ground water must be tapped and be in place for conjunctive use. Wells have always been an integral part of successful desert societies.
Just as Denver used to consider outside water use (lawns) as it’s drought insurance, water that could easily be switched to drinking and bathing in times of need. Having wells online insures an additional supply in case of extended drought, to protect the health and well-being of the population. Look toward arid parts of the world, I suspect it has always been so.
Maybe the Hobbs- NCWCD-Boulder water syndicate, realize this and just feel the most effective means of controlling this insurance water is just to steal it. With from 900,000 to 1,200,000 acre feet in storage there and a growing population base it would make sense. We know from their statements and writings that the syndicate considers farmers no more than caretakers of the water the farmers use anyway. If the cities have to buy the water from the caretakers so be it, but it’s cheaper to steal it, and buy owning the court it’s easier to steal as well.